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M any significant evidence decisions were handed down during this
survey period. The cases of greatest importance fall into these sub-
stantive areas: (1) Hearsay Rule and Exceptions; (2) Best Evidence Rule; (3)
Expert Opinion Evidence; (4) Impeachment; (5) Marital Privilege; (6) Parol
Evidence Rule; (7) Wrongful Death Suit-Ceremonial Remarriage; (8)
Cross-Examination; (9) Dead Man's Statute; and (10) Admissibility of
Sound Recordings.
I. HEARSAY RULE AND EXCEPTIONS
Business Records Exception. Several decisions within the survey period
dealt with the application of the hearsay rule or one of its exceptions. In Sid.
Merchant v. Farmers Insurance Group' plaintiff recovered a money judg-
ment for the fraudulent sale of a stolen motor home to the plaintiff. One of
the defendants appealed contending that no evidence connected him with
the false representation made by the other defendant. The primary evidence
relied upon by plaintiff to sustain the jury's finding connecting the appealing
defendant to the false representation was a statement by the non-appealing
defendant that the former was "in on it with me." 2 Rejecting the plaintiff's
contention that this statement had probative value, the court of civil appeals
reversed and rendered judgment for defendant. The court reasoned that this
statement was "hearsay as to Scott [appealing defendant] and amounts to no
evidence. -3
The plaintiff in Hallmark Builders, Inc. v. Anthony4 sought to overcome
an anticipated hearsay objection by reliance on article 3737e, 5 the business
records exception to the hearsay rule. Plaintiff, an electrical contractor,
brought suit in quantum meruit against a general contractor. In seeking to
establish the reasonable value of the work performed on two jobs, the
plaintiff identified and introduced five exhibits. These exhibits, which the
plaintiff claimed were invoices, were compiled from original records. The
exhibits listed items and charges but did not show specific dates as to when
each item was furnished, when the work was performed, or when the
exhibits were compiled. On appeal the defendant contractor challenged the
* LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. 540 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
2. Id. at 751.
3. Id.
4. 547 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
5. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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evidentiary support for the trial court's findings supporting the plaintiff's
claim for damages.
The plaintiff relied on University Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Security
Lumber Co.6 to support his alleged compliance with article 3737e. In Securi-
ty Lumber Co. it was held that the testimony of a qualified witness support-
ed the implied finding of the trial judge that the invoices introduced were
made in the regular course of business and were made at or near the time of
the recorded act or reasonably soon thereafter. 7
Distinguishing Security Lumber Co., the court of civil appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for trial because the
plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support his claim for
recovery. The court concluded that the five exhibits were not admissible
under article 3737e and that any testimony predicated on such exhibits was
inadmissible as hearsay under the rule announced in Lewis v. Southmore
Savings Ass'n.8 Although the plaintiff testified that notations were made
regarding the materials as the job progressed, such memoranda were not
contained in the exhibits introduced. The notations were instead kept on
note pads that were destroyed after the invoices were prepared. The plain-
tiff's exhibits were therefore not the records made at or near the time of the
act, as required by article 3737e, but instead were summaries of the records
prepared at a later time. Since the plaintiff's exhibits were summaries, his
failure to make available to the opposing party all of the records from which
the summaries were taken precluded him from using article 3737e to circum-
vent the hearsay rule. 9
Similar issues arose in another suit for breach of a construction contract.
In Hanson Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac Construction Co. 10 the defendant,
appealing from a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, contended that the
plaintiff's damages were not supported by the evidence. Defendant specifi-
cally argued that exhibit 47, the only evidence supporting the damage award,
was inadmissible hearsay. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that
the document was admissible as a business record under article 3737e.
Plaintiff argued that its comptroller had testified that the exhibit was made in
the regular course of business, that the exhibit was made "reasonably soon"
after the invoices were received, and was therefore admissible under the
holding in Security Lumber Co." The court of civil appeals distinguished
Security Lumber Co. because the underlying invoices supporting exhibit 47
were not admissible in Hanson. The court considered significant the fact
6. 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1967); see note 9 infra.
7. 423 S.W.2d at 289.
8. 480 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1972). Lewis held that a witness may testify from extractions
from records if the complete records are made available to the opposing party.
9. In order to introduce a summary of voluminous records, the introducing party must
show that the underlying records were (1) voluminous, (2) accessible to the opposing party, and
(3) admissible. Black Lake Pipeline Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976). The
court of civil appeals in Hallmark Builders, Inc. distinguished Security Lumber Co. by stating
that the invoices in the latter were not summaries made after the whole project was completed
and that the delivery tickets, which were supporting documents, had been introduced in
evidence.
10. 554 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. See text at note 7 supra.
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that the defendant's comptroller's "personal knowledge" was limited to the
receipt of bills from various subcontractors; thus, the comptroller had no
independent knowledge that such services or materials were rendered or
supplied. 12
On motion for rehearing in Hanson the plaintiff asserted that information
showing that the services and materials represented by the invoice were
actually furnished had been provided to the comptroller by other employees
of the plaintiff through delivery tickets attached to the invoices. The court
accepted that assertion as true, but nevertheless held that article 3737e was
not satisfied because there was no testimony that an employee of the
plaintiff "with personal knowledge that the materials were furnished or the
services were rendered made any notation on the delivery tickets or trans-
mitted information to another employee for notation on the delivery ticket
nor is there any testimony that delivery tickets are made in the regular
course of Dal-Mac's business.' ' 3 The court concluded that plaintiff's evi-
dence at best merely showed that delivery tickets were attached to some
invoices.
The qualifications of the witness used to introduce business records were
also considered in Matrix Computing, Inc. v. Davis. 4 In that case the
plaintiff appealed from an instructed verdict granted to the defendant due to
plaintiff's failure to introduce any evidence of damages. The plaintiff argued
that five exhibits showing damages had been properly authenticated for
admission as business records pursuant to article 3737e and that the trial
court had erred in excluding them. The plaintiff's only authenticating wit-
ness, however, was its current president.
The appellate court disposed of the first exhibit by stating that it was a
summary and did not meet the test of admissibility set forth in Black Lake
Pipe Line Co. v. Union Construction Co.' 5 because the admissibility of the
underlying records had not been shown. The remaining four exhibits were
also held to be inadmissible, but for a different reason. Those exhibits were
actually records the witness had obtained from other companies and the
mere recitation by the plaintiff's president of the statutory prerequisites was
held to be insufficient to satisfy any of the requirements of article 3737e.
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Stricklin16 plaintiff sued on a fire
insurance policy. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court improperly
admitted a summary of certain repair expenses. The underlying records
consisted of invoices covering repairs to the entire unit, not just the
damaged portion of the property. These records did not disclose whether the
expenditures were made for repairs necessitated by the fire damage or were
for general repairs unrelated to the fire. The two witnesses who testified
about the preparation of the summary indicated that the invoices were
12. The court also held that exhibit 47 did not qualify as a summary under the three-prong
test enunciated in Black Lake Pipeline Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976).
For the requirements of that test see note 9 supra.
13. 554 S.W.2d at 725.
14. 554 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
15. 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976); see note 9 supra.
16. 556 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ filed).
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marked with a code which allocated repair costs between the fire damage
and other repairs.
The court of civil appeals followed the Black Lake test 17 and held that for
a summary to be admissible, the underlying records must be admissible. The
underlying records were not admissible in Stricklin because the evidence did
not show that this code was placed on the invoices by an employee with
personal knowledge of the facts or that such an employee transmitted the
information to another employee who made the notations in the regular
course of business, nor did it show that the entry was made at or near the
time that the repairs were made.'"
The hearsay rule was the basis for reversing and remanding a judgment
for the defendant in Avila v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ,19 a
workmen's compensation case. The plaintiff argued that it was reversible
error to admit into evidence the deposition testimony of an orthopedic
surgeon as to his observations and conclusions based on X-rays taken on the
plaintiff. These X-rays were never produced or admitted into evidence and
were not available for inspection by plaintiff or his counsel either at the time
of taking the deposition or at the time of the trial. After noting that "Texas
cases concerning whether an X-ray may be interpreted without its physical
presence in Court are divided," the court of civil appeals reasoned that
"fairness requires [the X-rays'] presence in Court during interpretation"
and that "[a] contrary rule . . . could lead to much abuse." 2° The court also
determined that testimony concerning the X-rays was improperly admitted
because the X-rays were not sufficiently proven up in that there was no
positive evidence: (a) as to who made the X-rays; (b) that they were taken by
a qualified technician or doctor; (c) that they correctly portrayed what they
purported to represent; and (d) that such X-rays actually portrayed the
portion of the plaintiff's body where the injury was involved.2
Refreshing Past Recollection. In Decker v. Commercial Credit Equipment
Corp.22 the defendants appealed from a judgment awarding the plaintiff the
balance due under a purchase security agreement. To meet its burden that
the obligation sought to be enforced was within the Reneral subiect matter of
the contract, the plaintiff was required to prove that the alleged deficiency,
which the defendant Sanders was obligated to assume, was the result of any
of the first three repossessions of certain farm equipment. Plaintiff in-
troduced the testimony of its general manager to satisfy its burden. The
general manager, however, testified only after consulting the company's
repossession log. The defendants contended that his testimony was hearsay
and without probative value.
17. See note 9 supra.
18. 556 S.W.2d at 581.
19. 551 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Id. at 456. See also 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 795 (J. Chadbourn rev. 3d ed. 1970): "In
view of this importance of interpretation, a witness who testifies orally to knowledge obtained
by studying an X-ray photograph must be prepared to produce the photograph-print . . . for
cross-examination to the grounds of his interpretation." (Emphasis added.)
21. 551 S.W.2d at 457.
22. 540 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
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The court of civil appeals upheld the decision of the trial court because
"such testimony was admissible and competent under the rules of evidence
relating to past recollection.- 23 Although the court recognized that the
"usual method [of guaranteeing the correctness] is for the witness to state
that he remembers when he made or saw the memorandum he knew it to be
correct, ' 24 the plaintiff apparently did not ask the general manager any such
questions. The court thereupon noted that other methods of guaranteeing
the correctness of the document are permissible, such as verification based
on a general course of business or a habit of keeping records. The court then
determined that the general manager's testimony was admissible because
"he testified it was made in the regular course of business by those under his
direction and supervision, and he attested to its accuracy. "25
II. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Photographic Copies. Article 3731c, 26 which permits the use of photo-
graphic copies of written instruments, was construed in Clement v. Nacol.
21
On appeal the defendant contended that it was error to admit into evidence a
xerox copy of a warranty deed purporting to convey title to the land
involved from plaintiff's immediate predecessor to the plaintiff. The evi-
dence established that if the plaintiff had title to the land involved, it was by-
virtue of that deed. When the plaintiff offered the copy of the deed into
evidence, the defendant objected on the grounds that it was not the best
evidence and because a proper predicate had not been laid. The trial court
overruled the objection and admitted the exhibit into evidence.
The best evidence rule generally provides that if the original writing is not
produced or its non-production accounted for, secondary evidence of a
writing's contents is admissible. 28 The plaintiff in Clement, however, neither
sought to comply with this rule nor to comply with any of the exceptions to
the rule. Plaintiff relied solely on article 3731c contending that the copy of
the deed was admissible because there was no bona fide dispute as to its
being an accurate reproduction of the original. The court of civil appeals
held that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the exhibit.
The court determined that since "it was incumbent on [plaintiff] to lay a
predicate by showing that there was no bona fide dispute as to the copy
being an accurate reproduction of the original," and because he failed to do
so, "there was no evidence from which [the trial court] could conclude that
there was no bona fide dispute between the parties "29 on that point. Clement
23. Id. at 849. The requirements for the use of a memorandum to reflect one's past
recollection are: (1) the witness has no present recollection, but when the events were fresh a
correct memorandum was made, and (2) the witness must be able to guarantee the correctness
of the memorandum. See I C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 541-544 (2d
ed. 1956).
24. 540 S.W.2d at 849.
25. Id.
26. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3731c (Vernon Supp. 1978).
27. 542 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
28. Hill v. Taylor, 77 Tex. 295, 14 S.W. 366 (1890); Wheat v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 310
S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. 542 S.W.2d at 267.
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clearly establishes that a "bona fide dispute" within the meaning of article
3731c is raised by a best evidence objection.
III. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
The burden of proof which must be met by the plaintiff in medical
malpractice actions in Texas was explained in the leading case of Bowles v.
Bourdon.3" The Texas Supreme Court announced that expert testimony is
generally required to establish that the defendant doctor was negligent and
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Subsequent decisions have interpreted Bowles in such a manner that only
certain, precise questions can be asked to satisfy that burden of proof. A
medical expert, for example, is not competent to express an opinion as to
what constitutes "malpractice" or "negligence" or "what a reasonable and
prudent doctor would have done under the same or similar circum-
stances."31 The rationale for these restrictions is that these opinions consti-
tute conclusions which only the trier of facts may draw, and therefore they
invade the province of the jury. 32 Texas courts, on the other hand, have
allowed medical experts to testify as to what medical practices are
"correct" in certain circumstances, 33 that certain hypothetical acts are
"against good [medical] practice," 34 and that certain acts fall below the
"standard of conduct" of the other doctors. 3
One decision during the survey period involved these restrictions on
expert testimony. In Lee v. Andrews 36 the plaintiff's medical expert testified
as to possible deviations by the defendant doctor from applicable standards.
The witness testified that "[i]f I-the word 'malpractice' was committed, at
least timely treatment was not awarded this gentlemen (sic) in that errors
had been made which went unrecognized, untreated even though they were
obvious."13 After noting that Snow v. Bond 38 and its progeny preclude a
medical expert witness frompassing judgment on the correctness or incor-
rectness of the defendant's conduct, 39 the court of civil appeals held that the
trial court erred in admitting this testimony into evidence. The court further
held that such error was harmless in light of other evidence tending to
establish the defendant doctor's negligence.
30. 148 Tex. 1,219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
31. Snow v. Bond, 438 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. 1969). During the survey period one decision,
following Snow, held that an expert witness in a medical malpractice case cannot be asked
"what a reasonably prudent doctor or an average doctor or treating doctor or any hypothetical
doctor would have done under the same or similar circumstances." Smith v. Guthrie, 557
S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ filed).
32. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Scarborough, 556 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1977, writ granted), which held that the plaintiff's family physician was not qualified
to construe the group medical policy in dispute or give his opinion on the subject. The expert
witness could only "give his opinion ... as [to] medical facts, he may not determine the legal
classification or effect of such facts; that is a matter entrusted to the courts." Id. at 110.
33. Prestegord v. Glenn, 441 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1969).
34. Cleveland v. Edwards, 494 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1973,
no writ).
35. Martisek v. Ainsworth, 459 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36. 545 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ granted).
37. Id. at 243.
38. 438 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1969).
39. Id. at 551; see note 31 supra.
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Although it is generally true that expert testimony is not binding on the
trier of fact, a recent decision reaffirmed an exception to that rule. In Exxon
Corp. v. West' Exxon appealed from a judgment decreeing the rights of
certain royalty owners to gas produced from an underground reservoir. The
only evidence introduced at the trial was the testimony of two witnesses, a
geologist and a petroleum engineer, both of whom were employed by Ex-
xon. Both witnesses gave their expert opinions that the total amount of gas
which could have been in place in the reservoir, as of the date the storage
operations were commenced, was 95.3 billion cubic feet. At the conclusion
of their testimony, both sides rested, and the trial court entered its judgment
in favor of the Wests, declaring that Exxon was required to account to them
for royalty on all gas produced from the field regardless of whether the gas
was native or stored. The trial court concluded that Exxon failed to establish
with reasonable certainty the maximum volume of either the recoverable gas
or the total gas that could have remained in the reservoir when gas storage
operations commenced. The trial court indicated in its findings that it did not
believe the opinions of Exxon's experts and that since Exxon failed to meet
its evidentiary burden, the Wests were entitled to be paid royalties on all gas
produced from the reservoir.
The court of civil appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
rendered judgment in Exxon's favor. The court acknowledged the general
rule that the opinion testimony of an expert, even though not contradicted,
is not binding upon the trier of facts, and that "[t]his is particularly true
where the experts' testimony is based upon studies made while in the
employ of the party who is offering their testimony." 41 The court, neverthe-
less, held that the opinions of the two experts in this case were conclusive
because they were otherwise credible and free from contradiction and
inconsistency. The court reasoned that the witnesses' "testimony was clear,
direct and positive and there was nothing to cause any reasonable suspicion
as to the credibility of their testimony," and that the Wests' failure to
introduce contrary evidence "constitutes effective corroboration of the
testimony of these witnesses. '42
One problem that frequently confronts a trial court is the admissibility of
an expert's opinion when that opinion is partly based upon hearsay. United
States Fire Insurance Co. v. Stricklin, which was a suit on a fire insurance
policy, is illustrative of this problem. The defendant contended on appeal
that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of its expert and admit-
ting the testimony of plaintiff's expert. Both experts based their respective
opinions on the same facts and had similar professional experience. Both
experts were engaged at the time of trial as independent adjusters and both
had previously been employed by the defendant as staff adjusters. Plaintiff
made no objection to the qualifications of the defendant's expert, but
objected to his testimony on the ground that it was based upon hearsay. This
40. 543 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 672.
42. Id. at 673.
43. 556 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ filed).
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objection was sustained, and the expert's opinion testimony was excluded.
Plaintiff contended on appeal that the trial court's ruling was proper and not
inconsistent as no objection was made by defendant to the testimony of
plaintiff's expert on the basis of hearsay or lack of qualification.
The court of civil appeals rejected plaintiff's contention and held that
opinions of most experts are necessarily based in part on hearsay. The court
considered significant the fact that defendant's expert's opinion was also
based upon facts of which he had personal knowledge and noted that the
defendant's expert used cost guides accepted by various area contractors as
well as information received in telephone conversations with contractors.
The court recognized that this latter information was hearsay, but held that
"it is one way that an expert on repair costs can keep current on construc-
tion costs" and, therefore, "[t]his method is perfectly permissible."" The
court determined that since any expert must in part use hearsay as a basis
for his opinion, "the better view is to admit the testimony . . . thus leaving
to the jury the weight to be given the opinion rather than excluding it." 45 The
court concluded that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
exclude one expert's opinion and admit the other when both were based on
similar information.
The chief controversy between the parties in Graham v. Oak Park Mobil
Homes Inc. 46 was the cause of a fire in the area of the water heater in
plaintiff's mobile home. After a favorable verdict for the plaintiff, the trial
court granted defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. on the the ground that
the plaintiff's expert's opinion about the cause of the fire amounted to no
evidence "because it was based on hearsay and was no more than a qualified
guess."'47 The court of civil appeals determined that the expert witness had a
clear opinion as to the cause of the fire, notwithstanding the fact that "he
used the words 'apparently' and 'apparent' in his opinion and even though
he indicated on cross-examination 'possibilities' of other causes."' 48 The
appellate court further reasoned that the jury was entitled to consider the
expert's opinion because the opinion, even if based on hearsay information,
"is not valueless or inadmissible." 49 Judgment was reversed and rendered in
the plaintiff's favor.
44. Id. at 580.
45. Id.
46. 546 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
47. Id. at 397.
48. Id.
49. Id. Although an expert may give his opinion and, in so doing, rely on hearsay informa-
tion, the expert may not rely on just any hearsay. For example, one expert cannot base his
opinion on the hearsay opinions of other experts. Perkins v. Springstun, 557 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ filed). The hearsay source should be acceptable to the members
of the expert's profession, and it should be confirmed insofar as is practical. Lewis v.
Southmore Say. Ass'n, 480 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1972). See also Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d
300 (Tex. 1966); 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 23, §§ 800, 1400, 1404. Thus, a medical
expert's recitation of the history of the injury as reported to him by the plaintiff, although
admissible to show the basis of the doctor's opinion, is not competent evidence that an injury in
fact occurred. See, e.g., Presley v. Royal Indem. Co., 557 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1977, no writ). Furthermore, the party against whom the evidence is introduced is
entitled, in a jury trial, to an instruction that the "expert's hearsay is not evidence of the fact





Admissions Against Interest. In Howland v. Hough,5° a trespass to try
title action, the plaintiff appealed from a take nothing judgment. One of the
plaintiff's assertions on appeal was that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit into evidence a deed from the defendants to a third party. The deed
executed by the defendants to the third party contained a recitation by
which, arguably, defendants recognized the disputed tract as belonging to
plaintiff. The plaintiff's theory was that the deed was admissible as an
admission against interest because at the time of trial the defendants were
claiming title to the disputed tract. Since evidence of conduct by a party
which is inconsistent with his present position is generally admissible against
the party as an admission against interest,5' it was held that the trial court
committed reversible error in failing to admit the deed.
Similarly, in Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Squyres"2 an
insurance company sought to introduce into evidence a motion in limine, a
certified copy of the verdict, and a certified copy of the judgment in a prior
suit filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in a suit to recover under a disability
insurance policy, alleged that he was disabled because of a back injury.
Defendant's theory was that plaintiff's disability was not solely caused by
the accident in question, but was caused by a prior accident. The motion in
limine from the prior lawsuit contained a statement that "[t]he suit referred
to above resulted from an injury to Plaintiff, involving primarily his lum-
bosacral spine." 53 The trial court refused to permit the documents to be
introduced and defendant appealed from an adverse verdict. In rejecting the
defendant's contention that the motion in limine was admissible, the court of
civil appeals gave three reasons: (1) the burden was on the defendant to
delete the inadmissible matter from that which was admissible and, having
failed to do so, the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence; (2) the
evidence was immaterial as to whether the plaintiff was totally and perma-
nently disabled from the accident in question in view of the plaintiff's
uncontested testimony that he recovered from the prior injury and in the
absence of any evidence connecting the prior injury with the present case;
and (3) even if the trial court did err in excluding the motion in limine, it was
not reversible error.54 The court's rationale for the third basis of its ruling
was that the defendant was fully able to develop testimony from the plaintiff
and a medical expert regarding the plaintiff's prior injury. 55
Although the affirmance in Squyres was probably a correct one, the first
two reasons given by the court for upholding the exclusion of the relevant
50. 553 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ granted).
51. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Scott, 152 Tex. 1, 253 S.W.2d 651 (1952); see 2 C. MCCOR-
MICK & R. RAY, supra note 23, § 1141.
52. 550 S.W,2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Id. at 417.
54. Id. The court of civil appeals also held that since the jury verdict and the judgment in
the prior suit, which the defendant also sought to introduce, were not statements made by the
plaintiff, and involved a different defendant, a different set of facts, and a different subject
matter, they were immaterial to the issues in the present case. Id. at 418.
55. Id. at 418.
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portion of the motion in limine are invalid. The record reflects that the
defendant's attorney did in fact offer part of the motion and that his offer
focused on the language quoted above.5 6 Moreover, the fact that the plain-
tiff, an interested witness, testified that there was no causal relationship
between the prior injury and the one in issue does no more than raise an
issue of fact.57 Prior pleadings of parties which are factually inconsistent
with their position in court as a matter of logic and justice are usually
admissible. In view, however, of the other evidence introduced, the third
reason given by the court-that an error in excluding the document was
harmless-was probably valid.
In United States v. Cook,58 a criminal case involving alleged mail fraud,
the issue presented was whether reversible error occurred in the admission
into evidence of injunctive documents prepared in settlement of a prior
action. The defendants had previously consented to the entry of orders of
injunction in settlement of a civil action filed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. When the government sought to introduce the documents,
defendants objected on the basis of rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.59 The government countered by relying on rule 404(b), arguing that
proof of the injunction's existence was necessary to show the common
scheme of defendants to perpetrate fraud, to prove intent and motive, and to
prove the existence of a scheme to defraud. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that "[t]o qualify for admission under rule 404(b)...
the injunction documents here would have to evidence the commission of
some crime, wrong or act at least related in nature to the present charge of
mail fraud." 61 Consequently, the court concluded that rule 404(b) was not
applicable because the document introduced neither admitted nor denied
any act of any kind. The court held that reversible error was committed as to
one defendant because the procedure called for by rule 403 was "unfair,"
but such error was not reversible as to the other defendant in view of other
evidence contained in the record.
Evidence of Other Accidents. In order to prove defective design, the
plaintiff in Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley62 sought to introduce evidence of other
accidents involving the same or similar model product made by the defend-
ant. These products were located in other apartments in the same apartment
56. Id. at 417.
57. See, e.g., Greenville Ave. State Bank v. Lang, 421 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1967, no writ).
58. 557 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1977).
59. FED. R. EVID. 403, which pertains to the bases of opinion testimony by experts,
provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
out-weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
60. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
61. 557 F.2d at 1152.
62. 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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complex. Over the defendant's objections several lay witnesses testified
that the defendant's product, a kitchen range, accidently ignited when a
control knob was merely brushed by clothing or one's body. The plaintiff's
theory of liability was that her kitchen range was defectively designed
because of its propensity to ignite. The defendant argued on appeal that the
admission of evidence of other accidents constituted reversible error.
Evidence of other accidents involving the same product can be admitted
to establish the product's dangerous or hazardous nature.63 The accidents,
however, must have occurred under the same or substantially similar condi-
tions as the one involving the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals in Sibley
agreed with the trial court's decision to admit such evidence because it saw
"no difference in evidence of this type to show that the design is defective
from the evidence offered by [defendant] that no difficulty had been experi-
enced by any other user of this model range. "6
Prior Wrongful Acts. At least one decision during the last year involved
the question of impeachment under the new Federal Rules of Evidence. In
United States v. Herzberg65 both defendants were found guilty of devising a
scheme and artifice to defraud using the mails. The government cross-
examined one of the defendants on the subject of a prior, unrelated civil
fraud judgment taken against both defendants and introduced testimony as
to that defendant's reputation for truthfulness in the community. The de-
fendants, on appeal from their convictions, claimed that the trial court erred
in permitting the government to introduce such evidence.
Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence" provides several avenues
for the introduction of evidence of prior wrongful acts of a witness. In
Herzberg one defendant was directly impeached by extrinsic evidence as to
a civil fraud matter on which there had been no criminal conviction. The
question thus became whether such prior wrongful act was a collateral
matter. If it was, such evidence should have been excluded because a
witness may not generally be impeached with extrinsic evidence as to a
collateral matter. After recognizing that the subject involved was not a
collateral matter "if the witness testified on that subject on direct examina-
tion," the court concluded that "the topic, while perhaps cracked open on
direct examination of one witness, did not emerge during direct examination
63. See, e.g., Keyser v. Lackey, 523 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no
writ); Davis, Evidence of Post-Accident Failures, Modifications, and Design Changes in Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 792 (1974).
64. 546 S.W.2d at 855.
65. 558 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1977).
66. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination of the witness (I) concerning his character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruth-




of the defendant." 67 Such evidence thus amounted to impeachment by
extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter in violation of rule 608(b).
V. MARITAL PRIVILEGE
In a federal criminal action where only one spouse is a defendant and the
prosecutor seeks to call the other spouse as a witness the rule is that either
the defendant spouse or the witness spouse may claim the marital privilege
to prevent the witness spouse from testifying. 68 A spouse, however, is
competent to testify on behalf of a defendant spouse if both consent.69
One case within the last year dealt with a claim of marital privilege where
both spouses were defendants. In United States v. Hicks70 a husband and
wife had been indicted for various federal narcotics offenses along with
many other defendants, some of whom had already pleaded guilty. The
defendants filed a motion for separate trial, asserting that they should be
accorded separate trials because a joint trial would limit their claim of
marital privilege.
The district court rejected the defendants' initial argument that the marital
privilege in federal court is a constitutional right, citing Hawkins v. United
States.7 Hawkins held that the marital privilege was a common law rule of
evidence designed to maintain marital and family harmony. 72 The district
court then addressed the issue of who may claim the privilege by stating that
although either spouse, whether defendant or potential witness, can claim
the privilege, "[t]here is, unfortunately, a dearth of caselaw and a conflict of
theory in the situation where both spouses are co-defendants. 73
The district court decision weighed the conflicting policies of protecting
marital harmony on the one hand against the desirability, in criminal con-
spiracy cases, of trying all defendants together. Separate trials for alleged
co-conspirators are not to be granted as a right, but only when a reasonable
prospective evaluation of the evidence indicates that one co-defendant will
be prejudiced by the defense of another. The court's deliberations were
made more complex by the relatively rare incidence of married co-defend-
ants. Although noting that two commentaries had advocated an automatic
severance of trials involving co-defendant spouses, 74 the court held that the
better course would be to defer its ruling on the severance motion until the
federal prosecutor had presented his evidence. At the conclusion of the
government's case if one spouse definitely would take the stand in his own
behalf and the other spouse would claim the marital privilege, the court
67. 558 F.2d at 1223.
68. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74(1958); United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360,
1364 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fields, 458 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1972). See also 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 20, §§ 2332-2341 (J. McNaughton rev. 3d ed. 1961); Comment, The
Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208, 231 (1961).
69. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933).
70. 420 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
71. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
72. Id. at 76. Since the rule is of common law rather than constitutional origin, the
Congress or courts could alter the evidentiary rule at will for the federal judicial system.
73. 420 F. Supp. at 536-37.
74. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 505[04] (1975); Symposium,
Marital Privileges and the Right to Testify, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 196, 207-08 nn.48-52 (1966).
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could better perceive the prejudical effect the spouse's testimony might
create and the non-frivolous nature of the claim of privilege by the other
spouse. The court held that if separate trials were granted on a claim of
marital privilege, the defendant spouse claiming the privilege would be
barred from calling the other spouse as a witness in the separate trial. The
defendants' motion for separate trial of the spouses was denied without
prejudice, thereby permitting the motion to be renewed after completion of
the prosecution's case.
VI. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Many decisions involving application of the parol evidence rule arise each
year in opinions of Texas appellate courts. Two of these decisions deserve
mention in this survey. In Ross v. Stinnett75 a building contractor brought
suit against a homeowner to recover the unpaid balance due under an alleged
oral contract to build a house. The evidence established that the parties had
executed a mechanics' and materialmen's lien contract. At the request of the
defendant some changes in the plans and specifications were made during
the course of the construction. After the house was completed a conflict
arose between the parties over the amount owed by the homeowner. Plain-
tiff asserted that the defendant had orally agreed, prior to the execution of
the contract, to pay the cost plus fifteen percent to have the house built.
Defendant, however, contended that the amount specified in the contract
was the binding agreement of the parties. The defendant paid the amount
provided in the contract but refused to pay the additional sum. Only two
special issues were submitted to the jury, one inquiring into whether the
defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the cost of construction plus fifteen per-
cent, and one concerning damages. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff
on the basis of favorable jury findings. On appeal the defendant asserted
that the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence of the alleged oral
contract because such evidence contradicted the express terms of the writ-
ten contract.
The parol evidence rule provides that, in the absence of fraud, accident,
or mistake, parol or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary
the terms of a written instrument.76 The plaintiff in Ross, however, did not
plead fraud, accident, or mistake; instead, he relied on the rule announced in
Bell v. Mulkey.7 The plaintiff contended that the written contract was never
intended to be binding as an agreement between the parties, but was signed
only as a matter of form to enable defendant to secure a loan. The court in
Ross rejected the plaintiff's position and distinguished Bell on the ground
that the rule there enunciated only applied when the written contract sought
to be avoided by parol proof "is a sham in its entirety, and not merely that
75. 540 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
76. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955). The parol
evidence rule, however, is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law. Hubacek v.
Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30 (1958).
77. 7 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928), aff'd, 16 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Comm'n
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some of its terms are not in accord with the prior parol agreement .... "78
The court noted that the plaintiff argued that the written contract was a
sham only insofar as it concerned consideration for construction of the
house, rather than in its entirety. 79 The court thus held that plaintiff's
evidence of the prior oral agreement was inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule. The court reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant.
The parol evidence rule, however, will not preclude the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to establish that a party other than the signatory to the
written contract may be liable under the agreement. In Nelson v. Texas
Power & Light Co. 80 it was held that extrinsic evidence is ordinarily admissi-
ble to establish the identity of an undisclosed principal and to hold him liable
upon a contract entered into by his agent and for his benefit. The court
reasoned that such proof does not vary or alter the terms of the contract, but
simply permits a new party to be bound because of his relationship to the
party in whose name the contract was executed.
VII. WRONGFUL DEATH SUIT-CEREMONIAL REMARRIAGE
The question concerning the admissibility of evidence of a widow's cere-
monial remarriage was presented once again. In Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen8"
the Texas Supreme Court held that article 4675a82 made such evidence
admissible; consequently, it was reversible error to exclude evidence of the
widow's ceremonial remarriage in a wrongful death case. In Conway v.
Chemical Leamon Tank Lines, Inc. 83 the decedent's widow answered "yes"
on direct examination when she was asked if her marriage to the decedent
was her only marriage. This testimony was misleading. The district court,
however, prevented the defendant from referring to her remarriage. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "whether or not error is
harmless is a matter of federal law," notwithstanding the decision in
Brecheen which held that such error is reversible and never harmless.
Nevertheless, the court reversed, holding that article 4675a is "one of those
rare evidentiary rules which is so bound up with state substantive law that
federal courts sitting in Texas should accord it the same treatment as state
courts in order to give full effect to Texas' substantive policy." 85 The court
further reasoned that to hold otherwise would result in forum shopping in
which beneficiaries of the Texas wrongful death statutory scheme could
receive more favorable treatment in a federal court than in a state court.
App. 1929, jdgmt adopted) (parol evidence admissible to show writing purporting to be contract
was not intended to be such).
78. 540 S.W.2d at 495.
79. Id. at 496.
80. 543 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
81. 526 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1975).
82. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4675a (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides: "[E]vidence of
the actual ceremonial remarriage of the surviving spouse is admissible, if such is true, but the
defense is prohibited from directly or indirectly mentioning or alluding to any common-law
marriage, extramarital relationship, or marital prospects of the surviving spouse."
83. 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976).





The extent to which a witness may be cross-examined to show interest,
bias, or motive was addressed in General Motors Corp. v. Simmons.16 As a
general rule, interest, bias, or motive on the part of a witness may be elicited
on cross-examination. 7 This is true even though such examination inciden-
tally discloses that the defendant is protected by insurance."8 The problem in
Simmons was that the plaintiff entered into a "Mary Carter" settlement
agreement89 with two defendants. These defendants remained in the case as
defendants and aligned themselves with the plaintiff throughout the trial.
General Motors attempted to introduce into evidence the terms of the
settlement agreement but this evidence was excluded. Plaintiff sought to
uphold the trial court's ruling by reliance on the traditional Texas rule that
settlement agreements between the plaintiff and a co-defendant should be
excluded because a contrary rule would frustrate the policy favoring the
settlement of lawsuits.90 Plaintiff and the two settling defendants also argued
that there was no harm in excluding this evidence because "it was made
clear to General Motors, the court and the jury that [the settling defendants]
were not adverse to Simmons and were adverse to General Motors." 91
The court of civil appeals reformed the judgment by granting General
Motors contribution from the two settling defendants and rendered judg-
ment for the plaintiff for one-half of the original judgment. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts because the
nature of the settlement agreement had been excluded. In so holding the
court stated:
It was not an ordinary settlement agreement. By its terms Feld
acquired a direct financial interest in Simmons' lawsuit. The financial
interest of parties and witnesses in the success of a party is a proper
subject of disclosure by direct evidence or cross-examination. While
the alignment of the adversaries was disclosed, the jury did not know
the extent of Feld's interest or that it was a financial interest which
depended upon the amount of the judgment for Simmons . . . .That
kind of interest is a proper subject of cross-examination and proof.92
A similar problem arose in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales,93 a products
liability case. Before trial the plaintiff settled his claims against the defend-
ant-doctor, but continued his action against the manufacturer of the drug
that allegedly caused his deafness. The manufacturer attempted to introduce
evidence of the settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the doctor
on the ground that this evidence reflected the credibility of Dr. Gonzalez by
showing the true alignment of the parties. 94 The trial court excluded this
86. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
87. See I C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 23, §§ 670-681.
88. See, e.g., Aquilera v. Reynolds Well Serv., Inc., 234 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1950, writ ref'd).
89. This type of settlement agreement, which derives its name from Booth v. Mary Carter
Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), usually provides that a settling defendant will
be reminbursed for the amount paid in settlement from funds recovered against the remaining
defendants.
90. See, e.g., McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968).
91. 558 S.W.2d at 857.
92. Id.
93. 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 21 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 179 (Feb. 4, 1978).
94. The defendant manufacturer also attempted to introduce the pleadings abandoned by
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evidence and the court of civil appeals affirmed. The appellate court also
held that, even if such evidence was admissible, the exclusion was harmless
error.
Before the supreme court95 the plaintiff sought to distinguish Simmons on
two grounds: (1) that Dr. Gonzalez did not personally retain any financial
interest in the plaintiff's recovery; and (2) that the doctor did not remain a
defendant through any action of his own or the plaintiff's. The supreme
court, however, rejected these distinctions and held that it was reversible
error to exclude evidence of the settlement agreement. The court concluded
that the evidence offered by Bristol-Myers for the purpose of showing the
bias or credibility of the doctor was admissible.
IX. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The applicability of article 3716,9 commonly referred to as the dead man's
statute, to a medical malpractice action was decided in Wilkinson v. Clark.9
The plaintiff sued the defendant-doctor alleging improper diagnosis, negli-
gent treatment, and negligence in failure to refer him to a specialist for
corrective eye surgery. The defendant-doctor died before trial and his inde-
pendent executrix was added as a party. Prior to trial the defendant filed a
motion in limine requesting that the plaintiff be instructed not to testify as to
any conversation "plaintiff had with Dr. Clark or as to any tests performed
by Dr. Clark during the case and treatment provided . . . , because such
conversations and test results are clearly transactions. . . as defined by the
Texas Dead Man's Statute ... ."98
The trial court sustained the motion in limine, and the plaintiff perfected
his bill of exception. The court, trying the case without a jury, rendered
judgment that the plaintiff take nothing. In holding that the trial court
properly excluded testimony of the plaintiff's medical treatment, the court
of civil appeals determined that the word "transaction" as used in article
3716 includes medical services rendered by a physician.
X. ADMISSIBILITY OF RECORDINGS
Sound recordings are admissible if the proper foundation has been laid.
The proper foundation usually consists of proof: (1) that the recording
device was capable of taking testimony; (2) that the operator of the device
was competent; (3) that the recording is authentic and correct; (4) that no
the plaintiff after he settled with the defendant-doctor. This evidence was excluded by the trial
court. The court of civil appeals held that this was error but harmless under the provisions of
TEX. R. Civ. P. 434. 548 S.W.2d at 429.
95. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 179 (Feb. 4, 1978).
96. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1976) provides (emphasis added):
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement by,
the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite
party; and the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions by or
against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any transac-
tion with such decedent.
97. 558 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ filed).
98. Id. at 491.
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changes, additions, or deletions have been made; (5) of the manner of the
preservation of the recording; (6) of identification of the speakers; and (7)
that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of induce-
ment.9 In Edwards v. State'00 the court of criminal appeals affirmed a
judgment based in part upon a recording of a conversation with the defend-
ant. Summarizing the cases discussing the proper foundation for the admis-
sion of a sound recording, the court held that certain of the enumerated
requirements can be inferred from testimony and need not be shown with
the same degree of particularity required for admission of other mechan-
ically acquired evidence, such as the results of a breathalyzer test. Edwards
held, for example, that if a person testifies that he made a tape recording and
that it coincided with what he heard the parties say, then that foundation is
sufficient to establish that the recording device was capable of taking tes-
timony and that the operator was competent. Likewise, "[t]he voluntary
nature of the conversation can be inferred from the facts and circumstances
of each case."' 0'
A proper foundation for the introduction of a tape recording was also held
to have been laid in In re Bates.02 Judge Bates argued that the predicate
required by Cummings v. Jess Edwards, Inc. 103 had not been satisfied. In
Bates a witness identified the equipment and gave testimony regarding the
circumstances surrounding the making of each tape. The witness also tes-
tified that he was familiar with the equipment's use, he identified the voices
on each tape, and he testified as to the authenticity of each tape and to his
consent. The chain of custody of the tapes was also established. The court
of criminal appeals held that a proper predicate for admission of the tapes
had therefore been established.
99. See, e.g., Cummings v. Jess Edwards, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 767, 772-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. 551 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
101. Id. at 733.
102. 555 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1977).
103. 445 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see text
accompanying note 101 supra.
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